Research

OVERVIEW:

My research explores fundamental questions in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and social epistemology. I am particularly interested in the significance of phenomenal consciousness for knowledge and epistemic justification. Thus, much of my research can be understood as being at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind. I am also interested in how social factors affect our knowledge. In particular, I am interested in the rational significance of peer-disagreement as well as the epistemic effects of algorithmic filtering and social information networks such as echo chambers.

In recognition of my research, I received the 2025 Graduate Student Presentation Award from the New York State Philosophical Association (Creighton Club), as well as the 2022 Outstanding Essay Award and the 2020 Payne Outstanding Essay Award from the University of Rochester’s Department of Philosophy.

PUBLICATIONS:

“Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem” (Synthese, 2024)

Abstract: I develop a novel argument against conciliationism. Conciliationism is a dominant view in the epistemology of disagreement that says that an epistemic agent should decrease their confidence in their own judgment about p when faced with peer-disagreement about p. A major objection to conciliationism is that it is self-undermining (roughly: given peer-disagreement among philosophers about conciliationism, conciliationism requires rejecting conciliationism). There have been many responses to the self-undermining problem. I argue that the self-undermining problem for conciliationism can occur not just in cases of peer-disagreement about conciliationism, but also in cases of peer-disagreement about peerhood. The result is that conciliationism is faced with two distinct higher-order problems, and the solutions so far developed to one do not extend to both.

You can download the paper here.

UNDER REVIEW (titles redacted):

A paper on having evidence (R&R)

Abstract: Evidentialism is the thesis that one’s epistemic justification is determined by the evidence that one possesses. An important but underdeveloped issue concerns how much of the information stored in one’s head counts as evidence that one currently possesses? According to the inclusive view of evidence possession, all the information in one’s head, whether occurrent or non-occurrent, counts as evidence one possesses. According to the moderate view, some but not all non-occurrently stored information counts. According to the restrictive view, only occurrent information counts. This paper evaluates these views. First, I argue that the inclusive view has unacceptable consequences concerning barely accessible memories. Second, I argue that the moderate view faces a problem akin to the generality problem for reliabilism. Third, I offer responses on behalf of the restrictive view against three objections—that stored information can defeat justification, provide justification, and is a necessary component of stored knowledge. I conclude that the restrictive view is the most plausible account of evidence possession.

A paper on whether justification is required for evidence possession (R&R)

Abstract: An important question for evidentialism is: what does it take to possess evidence? Feldman (2004) and McGrath (2018) argue that evidence possession requires more than psychological access—it must also satisfy an epistemic condition, such as being justified. In this paper, I argue that there is no epistemic condition on evidence possession. This is because, on evidentialism, one can have justification to believe some proposition p only if one has evidence E to believe p. An epistemic condition on evidence possession requires that a subject either has justification to believe E or some other positive epistemic status regarding E. If it requires justification, then an epistemic condition results in a problematic regress. If it requires some other positive epistemic status, then evidentialism loses what makes it distinctive as a theory of justification and risks denying internalism.

A paper on the implications of conflicting beliefs for evidentialism

Abstract: If internalism is true, then evidentialism combined with the restrictive view of evidence possession entails strong internalism—the view that one’s justification supervenes on one’s occurrent states. Strong internalism is considered by many to be counterintuitive and, therefore, unacceptable. In this paper, I consider some unexpected merits of strong internalism. In particular, I argue that strong internalism can better account for our intuitions about certain cases of irrationality, such as why it seems more irrational to consciously believe contradictory propositions rather than have the same propositions unconsciously stored in memory.

A paper on beliefs and introspection

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the scope of Declan Smithies’ simple theory of introspection does not include beliefs. According to the simple theory, having certain mental states puts one in a position to know that one has those mental states. And this is because having these mental states imply having special epistemic properties for believing that one is in those states. Smithies argues that the scope of the theory includes both one’s conscious states and one’s beliefs. I argue that his argument for it including one’s beliefs fail. Furthermore, I argue that the simple theory excludes one’s beliefs. This is because one has better reasons to believe that one has their experience than that they have some belief, which is impossible if the simple theory applies to both experiences and beliefs.

CURRENT PROJECTS:

“Withholding Belief is Not a Doxastic Attitude“

Abstract: According to the traditional view, there are three doxastic attitudes one can hold towards a proposition: belief, disbelief, and withholding belief. In this paper, I argue that withholding belief is not a doxastic attitude. Instead, withholding belief that p is, roughly, not holding a doxastic attitude towards p. To show this, I present four puzzles that, if withholding belief is a doxastic attitude, have no clear answers. These puzzles concern the compatibility of doxastic attitudes; the information stored by doxastic attitudes; the dispositions implied by doxastic attitudes; and the epistemic evaluation of doxastic attitudes. All four puzzles have straightforward answers if withholding belief is not a doxastic attitude. On that basis, I conclude that the traditional view is wrong—withholding belief is not a doxastic attitude.

“Evidential Safety: A Novel Account of Knowledge”

Abstract: This project develops an evidentialist-friendly account of knowledge that resolves the Gettier problem by requiring a tighter connection between one’s evidence and the truth. In a Gettier case, one’s evidence is, in some sense, disconnected from the truth of one’s belief. I argue that this disconnection can occur in two ways: one’s belief that p could easily have been false despite having evidence to believe p, or one’s total evidence could easily have failed to support believing p, despite p being true. To address this, I introduce the notion of evidential safety, which applies Sosa’s safety condition on knowledge to evidence possession. The resulting account retains the intuitive appeal of the traditional accounts of knowledge (like JTB) while being able to handle all of the classic Gettier cases. Furthermore, I argue that my account also helps to explain the value of knowledge and the distinction between a priori and a posteriori truths.

“The Epistemic Distinction Between Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles”

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that C. Thi Ngyuen’s distinction between epistemic bubbles and echo chambers is better construed as a difference in whether the epistemic social structure supports a certain kind of higher-order evidence. In particular, echo chambers are distinct from epistemic bubbles in that they support their members having evidence that non-members have misleading evidence. The upshot is that effective strategies for engaging with members of echo chambers should aim to defeat the member’s higher-order evidence, not their first-order evidence. This has practical applications. For example, if a member of an extremist cult has higher-order evidence that non-members are malicious and dishonest, then building friendship and trust with that person may be more effective than merely providing first-order evidence that the cult is wrong. After all, it shows that some of their higher-order evidence was misleading.

“Introspection, Evidence Possession, and the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction”

Abstract: In this project, I consider some of the results of the restrictive view of evidence possession for introspection. A posteriori knowledge depends on experience (to put it roughly) in a way that a priori knowledge does not. Introspective knowledge seems a posteriori (and not a priori) in that it depends on experience. But introspective knowledge can also seem a priori (and not a posteriori) in that hallucination cannot sever the connection between justification and truth. For example, in a case of a perceptual hallucination, you can have a posteriori justification to believe some false proposition like that there is a tree. But that would not stop you from having introspective justification to believe the true proposition that it seems to you as if there is a tree. This seems to be explained by the restrictive view of evidence possession. Given that one’s evidence is one’s experience, one’s evidence entails whatever experience one is having. Thus, you can only have the experience of it appearing to you as if there is a tree as evidence when it is true that you have that experience. And you cannot have that evidence when you do not have the experience of it appearing to you as if there is a tree. Thus, introspective knowledge requires experience (like a posteriori knowledge), but there can be a tight connection between evidence and truth (like a priori knowledge).

“A Doxastic-Perceptual Account of Rich Representational Content”

Abstract: In this project, I develop a novel account of higher-level representional content in phenomenal experience that is associated with recognition. For instance, say you walk into a crowded supermarket and unexpectedly see (what looks like) Barack Obama. Your experience of recognition may represent not just lower-level properties like shapes and colors but also higher-level (or rich) properties like being Barack Obama. Existing views explain rich content entirely in terms of either belief or visual perception, but both approaches face problems when it comes to recognition. For doxastic views, the relevant phenomenal experience can remain the same even when beliefs change (e.g., realizing it is not Barack Obama). For perceptual views, it seems impossible for one’s visual field to represent higher-level properties. My view avoids these problems by accounting for the rich content in recognitional experience by combining lower-level properties represented in one’s visual perception (e.g. x, y, z) with higher-level properties represented in one’s occurrent beliefs (e.g. Obama looks like x, y, z).

THE DISSERTATION (Long Abstract)

“On Evidence Possession: Evidentialism, Justification, and Knowledge“

In my dissertation, I develop the surprisingly underexplored notion of evidence possession. According to evidentialism, your epistemic justification is determined by the evidence you possess. But what counts as the evidence you possess? Since childhood, you’ve been taking in information through experience and storing it in your head. Does all of that information count as evidence you currently possess? Only some of it? Or is it only the information you are currently thinking about? While other questions about evidence—such as the nature of evidence and evidential support—have been extensively explored by philosophers, evidence possession has not. This is surprising given that the topic has substantial ramifications for evidentialism in particular and for epistemology in general. In chapter 1, I introduce the notion of evidence possession and distinguish between three views. According to the inclusive view, all of the information stored in one’s mind counts as evidence one possesses. According to the moderate view, some but not all non-occurrent, stored information counts. According to the restrictive view, only the information that one is conscious of counts. In chapter 2, I argue that the inclusive view has the unacceptable consequences that barely accessible, distant memories count as evidence that one possesses. More specifically, the view gets the wrong epistemic results on stored defeaters, contradictory beliefs, epistemic akrasia, and Moorean conjunctions. In chapter 3, I argue that the moderate view must appeal to dispositional mental states. But then it faces a challenge akin to the generality problem for reliabilism. For any disposition token, there are many disposition types. And there seems no principled way to select the appropriate disposition type. I also argue that analyzing evidence possession in terms of dispositions has the result that the moderate view, like the restrictive view, implies that we have far less justification than we typically think we have. In chapter 4, I defend the restrictive view from three objections—that non-occurrent, stored information can 1) defeat justification, 2) provide justification and 3) is epistemically required for non-occurrent knowledge. I argue that there are plausible responses to each. The surprising result is that what seems to be the most plausible account of evidence possession restricts one’s evidence to what one is conscious of. In Chapter 5, I argue that the restrictive view of evidence possession can account for cases of varying knowledge attributions better than epistemic contextualism without having to appeal to varying standards of knowledge. Much support for contextualism comes from cases like the following: while a person is in a conversation about skeptical scenarios (e.g. being a brain in a vat), it seems intuitive that they do not know that they have hands. But were they then to leave the conversation and do something else (like play basketball), then it seems intuitive that they do know they have hands. Contextualism explains these intuitions by arguing that the standards for knowledge vary between different contexts. However, the restrictive view provides another natural explanation for these intuitions—it is not the standards for knowledge that vary but what evidence one currently possesses.