Kevin Matti Gausselin

Curriculum Vitae

PhD in Philosophy
The University of Rochester
Rochester, NY

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Education

Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Rochester 2026
Dissertation: *On Evidence Possession: Evidentialism, Justification, and Knowledge*
Committee: Richard Feldman (advisor), Earl Conee, Andrew Moon (external member)
Defended May 6, 2026; degree conferred August 2026
M.A. Philosophy, University of Rochester 2024
M.A. Philosophy, Biola University (with high honors) 2019

AOS: Epistemology (traditional and social)
AOC: Philosophy of Mind, Ethics (incl. Business Ethics), Philosophy of AI, Philosophy of Religion

Academic Employment

Adjunct Instructor, Department of Business Administration, SUNY Brockport — Fall 2025 – current
Adjunct Instructor, Department of Philosophy Syracuse University — Fall 2025; Fall 2026
Adjunct Instructor, Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester — Summer 2024
Adjunct Instructor, Department of Philosophy, SUNY Brockport — Spring 2022; Fall 2023

Administrative Employment

Admin Graduate Assistant, Graduate Education and Postdoctoral Affairs Office, University of Rochester — Fall 2022 – Summer 2025

Publications

1. "Evidentialism and the Epistemic Condition on Evidence Possession." *Philosophical Quarterly* (2026)
2. "Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem." *Synthese* (2024)

Papers under Review (titles redacted):

3. A paper on having evidence (Currently R & R at *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*)

4. A paper on introspective justification
5. A paper on conflicting beliefs and evidence

Papers in Progress

6. "Withholding Belief Is Not a Doxastic Attitude"
7. "The Epistemic Distinction Between Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles"
8. "Evidence Is Ultimately Additive"

Presentations

Presented Papers:

"Evidentialism and the Epistemic Condition on Evidence Possession"

1. APA Eastern Division Meeting, Papers in Progress Workshop, January 2026
2. UCR-UCI Graduate Philosophy Conference, October 2025
3. The 170th Meeting of the Creighton Club, October 2025
    - Winner of the Graduate Student Presentation Award

"Withholding Belief Is Not a Doxastic Attitude"

4. 17th Annual Notre Dame/Northwestern Graduate Epistemology Conference, April 2026
5. Syracuse University Philosophy Graduate Conference, February 2026
6. University of Massachusetts, Amherst Philosophy Graduate Conference,, November 2025

"The Simple Theory of Introspection: Belief and Luminosity"

7. APA Pacific Division Meeting, Colloquium, March 2025
8. University of Iowa Graduate Philosophy Society Conference, March 2025

"On Evidence Possession"

9. APA Eastern Division Meeting, Symposium, January 2025
10. Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting, April 2024
11. Western Michigan University Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, February 2024

"Can Phenomenal Experience have Rich Representational Content?"

12. Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting (Poster Presentation), Cornell University, June 2025

"2-level Utilitarianism and Artificial Moral Agents"

13. University at Albany Philosophical Association Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2023
14. Upstate Workshop on AI and Human Values, March 2021

"Virtual Reality is not Genuine Reality"

15. Virtually Human: Philosophizing Through Games and Virtual Worlds, Molloy University, April 2023

"The Epistemic Distinction Between Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles"

16. University of Rochester, Humanists in Conversation on Conspiracy Conference, April 2022
17. University of Miami, Graduate Conference in Social Philosophy, September 2021

"Conciliationism and the Peer-Undermining Problem"

18. University of Calgary Philosophy Graduate Conference, May 2022
19. Brown University Mark L. Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2022

Presented Commentary:

1. Commentator on Gabriella Xin Zhang "Performance Errors as Skilled Actions: A Dilemma for a Propositional Account of Skill," *11th Biennial Rochester Epistemology Conference*, 2022

Teaching

As Primary Instructor

At State University of New York (SUNY), Brockport:

1.	Business, Government and Society (3 sections)	Fall 2026
2.	Business, Government and Society (2 sections)	Spring 2026
3.	Environmental Ethics and Sustainable Business	Spring 2026
4.	Business, Government and Society (2 sections)	Fall 2025
5.	Introduction to Philosophy	Fall 2023
6.	Introduction to Philosophy (2 sections)	Spring 2022

At Syracuse University:

7.	The Meaning of Life	Fall 2026
8.	Theories of Knowledge and Reality (2 sections)	Fall 2025

At University of Rochester:

9.	Contemporary Moral Problems	Summer 2024

As Teaching Assistant (guest lectures noted)

At University of Rochester:

1.	Philosophy of Brain and Cognitive Science	Spring 2024
2.	Reason and Argument (*lectured one time*)	Fall 2023
3.	Introduction to Philosophy (*lectured four times*)	Spring 2023
4.	Introduction to Philosophy	Fall 2022
5.	Environmental Justice (*lectured two times*)	Spring 2022
6.	Social and Political Philosophy (*lectured two times*)	Fall 2021
7.	Ethical Decisions in Medicine	Spring 2021
8.	Introduction to Ethics	Fall 2020

9. Introduction to Ethics — Spring 2020
10. Public Health Ethics — Fall 2019

Awards

1. *Graduate Student Presentation Award,* The 170th Meeting of the Creighton Club, NYS Philosophical Society, 2025
2. *Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award*: University of Rochester, 2024: $200
3. *Outstanding Essay Award*: $300 for "On Evidence Possession," 2022 (competition open to all graduate students in the philosophy department)
4. *Payne Outstanding Essay Award*: $200 for "Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem," 2020 (competition open to first year graduate students in the philosophy department)

Grants & Fellowships

1. *APA Graduate Student Stipend,* APA Pacific Division Meeting, 2025: $300
2. *APA Graduate Student Stipend,* APA Eastern Division Meeting, 2025: $300
3. *Humanities Professional Development Grant*, University of Rochester, Fall 2024: $500 (awarded by the University of Rochester's Arts, Sciences, and Engineering Graduate Education and Postdoctoral Affairs Office)
4. *Dean's Dissertation Fellowship*, University of Rochester, 2024-2025: $24,000 (awarded by the Dean of Arts, Sciences, and Engineering of the University of Rochester on the basis of departmental nomination and application material)
5. *Slattery Fellowship*: $8,000, University of Rochester, 2019-2021 (a fellowship to assist students who have demonstrated outstanding academic accomplishments in the field of humanities)
6. *SCP Alvin Plantinga Reading Group Award*: $3,000 with Timothy Pickavance, 2018 (awarded by the SCP to host undergraduate reading groups on the work of Alvin Plantinga)

Professional Service:

Journal Refereeing

1. *Synthese*, 2024

Organizing

1. Lead Organizer: 12th Biennial Rochester Epistemology Conference, University of Rochester, 2024
2. Co-organizer: 11th Biennial Rochester Epistemology Conference, University of Rochester, 2022
3. Co-coordinator: Alvin Plantinga Reading Group, Biola University, 2018

Chairing

1. Eastern Division Meeting, American Philosophical Association, 2026
2. Humanists in Conversation on Conspiracy Conference, 2022
3. AS&E Graduate Research Day, University of Rochester, 2022
4. Pacific Conference, Society of Christian Philosophers, 2017
5. Center of Christian Thought Conference, Biola University, 2017

Professional Association

1. American Philosophical Association (member)

Graduate Work in Philosophy:

(Audited = †)

Epistemology

1. *Epistemology of Journalism* (Seminar) – Zeynep Soysal [Rochester]†
2. *Skepticism and Epistemic Akrasia* (Seminar) – Earl Conee [Rochester]†
3. *Meaning and the A Priori* (Seminar) – Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal [Rochester]†
4. *Evidence Possession* (Directed Study 4 credits) – Richard Feldman [Rochester]
5. *Value of Knowledge* (Seminar) – Richard Feldman [Rochester]
6. *Higher-Order Evidence* (Directed Study 4 credits) – Richard Feldman [Rochester]
7. *Social Character of Knowledge* – Jens Kipper [Rochester]
8. *Epistemic Fallibilism* (Seminar) – Richard Feldman & Earl Conee [Rochester]
9. *Knowledge-First Epistemology* (Directed Study 3 credit) – Timothy Pickavance [Biola]
10. *Epistemology* – R. Douglas Geivett [Biola]

Philosophy of Mind/Philosophy of AI

11. *Computational Methods in the Philosophy of Language* (Seminar) – Jens Kipper [Rochester]
12. *AI and Consciousness* (Directed Study 1 credit) – Jens Kipper [Rochester]
13. *Philosophy of Mind* – Jens Kipper [Rochester]
14. *Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence* – Jens Kipper [Rochester]
15. *The Metaphysics of the Self* (Seminar) – Paul Audi & Earl Conee [Rochester]
16. *Advanced Philosophy of Mind* – JP Moreland [Biola]†
17. *Philosophy of Mind* – JP Moreland [Biola]

Metaphysics & Related Areas

18. *Philosophy of Science* – Mark Povich [Rochester]
19. *Metaphysics* – Zeynep Soysal [Rochester]
20. *Philosophy of Language* – Jens Kipper [Rochester]
21. *Philosophy of Religion* – R. Douglas Geivett [Biola]

22. *Metaphysics* – Timothy Pickavance [Biola]

Logic & Formal Methods

23. *Logical Methods* – Paul Audi [Rochester]
24. *Probability, Inference, & Decision* – Hayley Clatterbuck [Rochester]
25. *Intermediate Logic* – Zeynep Soysal [Rochester]
26. *Introduction to Symbolic Logic* – Timothy Pickavance [Biola]

Historical Philosophy

27. *Ancient Philosophy: Aristotle* – Natalie Hannan [Rochester]
28. *Early Modern Philosophy: Hume and Reid* – Alison Peterman [Rochester]
29. *Ancient Philosophy: Aristotle and Plato* (Directed Study 3 credits) – Greg Ganssle [Biola]
30. *Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes, Hume, Kant* (Seminar) – Greg Ganssle [Biola]

Ethics

31. *Metaethics (Seminar)* – Earl Conee [Rochester]†
32. *Value, Emotion and Moral Knowledge* (Seminar) – William Fitzpatrick [Rochester]
33. *Data, Algorithms, Justice* – Johnathan Herington [Rochester]
34. *History & Normative Systems of Ethics* – David Horner [Biola]

References:

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Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
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David Christensen (letter concerning "Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem")
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Dissertation Long Abstract

On Evidence Possession: Evidentialism, Justification, and Knowledge

In my dissertation, I develop the notion of *evidence possession*. According to evidentialism, your epistemic justification is determined by the evidence you currently possess. But what counts as the evidence you currently possess? While other questions about evidence—such as the nature of evidence and evidential support—have been extensively explored by philosophers, evidence possession has not. This is surprising given that the topic has substantial ramifications for epistemology in general and for evidentialism in particular.

In Chapter 1, I lay the groundwork for the project and distinguish between an epistemic and psychological condition on evidence possession. According to the epistemic condition, one's evidence is epistemically acceptable (e.g., justified). According to the psychological condition, one's evidence is psychologically available (e.g., can be brought to mind in the right way). I argue that the task of developing an account of evidence possession is the task of developing these two conditions.

In Chapter 2, I develop the epistemic condition. I argue that the epistemic condition is problematic unless one distinguishes between one's *ultimate* evidence and one's *derivative* evidence. Whereas one's derivative evidence depends on support from one's ultimate evidence, one's ultimate evidence does not depend on any other evidence. This clarifies the structure of evidence possession. There is an epistemic condition on possessing derivative evidence but not on possessing ultimate evidence.

In Chapters 3–5, I develop the psychological condition. I distinguish between three views of psychological availability. According to *the inclusive view*, all of the information stored in one's

mind counts as psychologically available. According to *the moderate view*, some but not all non-occurrent, stored information counts. According to *the restrictive view*, only the information one is conscious of counts. In Chapter 3, I argue that the inclusive view has the unacceptable consequence that deeply buried memories count as psychologically available. As a result, it allows for rational epistemic akrasia and Moorean conjunctions. In Chapter 4, I argue that the moderate view must appeal to dispositional mental states. But then it faces a challenge akin to the generality problem for reliabilism. For any disposition token, there are many disposition types. And there seems no principled way to select the appropriate disposition type. In Chapter 5, I defend the restrictive view from three objections—that non-occurrent, stored information can defeat justification, provide justification, and is epistemically required for non-occurrent knowledge. I argue that there are plausible responses to each. The result is that what seems to be the most plausible account of psychological availability restricts one's evidence to what one is conscious of.

In Chapter 6, I put together the epistemic condition and restrictive view of psychological availability to formulate an account of evidence possession concerning derivative evidence. I also formulate the corresponding account of ultimate evidence without an epistemic condition. The result is that one's evidence is, at the derivative level, the justified propositional content of one's occurrent beliefs, and at the ultimate level, one's conscious states.